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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue to be decided on appeal is whether Valley Bank 
and Dime Savings were transacting business under a common name and, 
as such, can be sued by that name. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As the trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss 
plaintiff's complaint, which motion was treated as one for summary 
judgment since matters outside the pleading were considered,1 the 
applicable standard of review is that set forth in Rule 56(c), Utah 
R. Civ. P.: 
[Whether] the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Id.; see also Rule 12(b)(stating that if, on a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), matters outside the pleading are 
xRecognizing that the motion would be treated as one for 
summary judgment, defendant moved the court to dismiss plaintiff's 
complaint pursuant to both Rules 12(b)(6) and 56, Utah R. Civ. P. 
(R. 6) 
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considered, the motion shall be treated as one for summary 
judgment). 
DETERMINATIVE RULE 
The determinative rule of civil procedure applicable to this 
case is Rule 17(d), which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
When two or more persons associated in any business 
either as a joint-stock company, a partnership or other 
association, not a corporation, transact such business 
under a common name, whether it comprises the names of 
such associates or not, they may sue or be sued by such 
common name. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 17(d). 
NATURE OF CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On November 24, 1992, shortly before the statute of 
limitations applicable to this case had run, plaintiff brought suit 
against "Willowcreek Plaza." (R. 8) Plaintiff alleged that on 
December 31, 1988, while on her way to her chiropractor's, she had 
slipped and fallen at the Willow Creek Plaza, a professional office 
complex. (JEd. ) A copy of the summons and complaint was served upon 
one of the managers of Willow Creek Plaza, L.C., which currently 
owns the office complex. (R. 8-9) 
Willow Creek Plaza, L.C., however, did not own the complex on 
the date of plaintiff's fall, so it filed a motion to dismiss 
plaintiff's complaint. (R. 9) It argued that it had not acquired 
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title to the property until November 8, 1991, nearly three years 
after the fall, and that at the time of the accident the property 
was owned by Valley Bank and Trust Company. (JGL ) Valley Bank had 
acquired title to the property on November 16, 1988, by virtue of 
a foreclosure action, and had conveyed the property to Wilford W. 
Goodwill and Dorothy P. Goodwill on September 4, 1991, and they in 
turn had transferred title to their company, Willow Creek Plaza, 
L.C. (Id.) 
The motion to dismiss was based on two grounds. First, Willow 
Creek Plaza, L.C, argued that absent ownership of the property, it 
could not be sued for plaintiff's accident. (.Id,.) Second, it 
argued that "Willowcreek Plaza" was simply the name of the complex 
where plaintiff fell, and was not a legal entity, separate from 
Willow Creek Plaza, L.C, subject to suit. (Id. ) 
Plaintiff responded to the motion by arguing that, although 
process had mistakenly been served on Willow Creek Plaza, L.C, the 
complaint should not be dismissed. Plaintiff argued that Valley 
Bank and Trust Company, which owned the complex, and another 
financial institution, Dime Savings Bank of New York, were doing 
business as "Willowcreek Plaza," and accordingly, could be sued by 
that common name pursuant to Rule 17(d), Utah R. Civ. P. (Id.) 
The court, however, dismissed plaintiff's complaint. (id.) It 
ruled that even if Valley Bank and Dime Savings were doing business 
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as "Willowcreek Plaza," since plaintiff had not served them with 
process, and more than 120 days had elapsed since the filing of the 
complaint, the court had no personal jurisdiction over them and it 
could not decide whether they were in fact doing business as 
"Willowcreek Plaza." (R. 9-10) The court, therefore, dismissed the 
case without prejudice, giving plaintiff an opportunity to refile 
the action, notwithstanding the tolling of the statute of 
limitations, under the savings statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40. 
(R. 10) 
Plaintiff refiled the case on September 17, 1993. (R. 2) 
Again, she named "Willowcreek Plaza" as defendant. (Id,.) She had 
process served on Valley Bank,2 and Valley Bank moved to dismiss 
the complaint on the ground that it and Dime Savings had not at any 
time done business as "Willowcreek Plaza." (R. 6-57) Judge Rokich 
ruled that Valley Bank and Dime Savings were not doing business as 
"Willowcreek Plaza" and granted the motion. (R. 82) Although this 
dismissal, too, was without prejudice, since plaintiff had already 
refiled once under the savings statute, and the savings statute 
only allows for one refiling, Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah 
State University, 813 P.2d 1216, 1221 n. 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
plaintiff took this appeal. (R. 103-04; 106-07) 
2The return of service is not part of the record and was 
apparently not filed with the clerk of the court by plaintiff's 
counsel. 
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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
In December of 1984, Valley Bank and Trust Company made a $3.5 
million construction loan to Willow Creek Shopping Village, Ltd., 
for the construction of the Willow Creek Plaza professional office 
complex. (R. 10) Prior to making the loan, Valley Bank entered 
into what is commonly known in the banking industry as a 
"participation agreement" with Dime Savings Bank of New York. (Id. ) 
Pursuant to the participation agreement, Valley Bank sold to Dime 
Savings an undivided 80% interest in the loan. (Id.) 
Willow Creek Shopping Village subsequently defaulted on the 
loan, and Valley Bank instituted foreclosure proceedings, 
eventually obtaining a sheriff's deed to the property on November 
16, 1988. (Id.) 
As owner of the premises, Valley Bank thereafter entered into 
various leases with tenants of the complex. (R. 11) All of the 
leases were executed by Valley Bank in the name of "Valley Bank and 
Trust Company." (Jld. ; see also R. 38-57.) 
Pursuant to the participation agreement, 80% of the rents 
derived by Valley Bank were paid to Dime Savings. (R. 11) At no 
time, however, did Valley Bank and Dime Savings transact business 
as "Willowcreek Plaza" or under any other common name. (Id.) All 
business transacted at the Willow Creek Plaza office complex was 
transacted in the name of Valley Bank alone. (Id.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly granted defendant's motion to dismiss 
plaintiff's complaint as Valley Bank and Dime Savings, even though 
they may have been associated in a business together, were not 
transacting such business under a common name as is required by 
Rule 17(d), Utah R. Civ. P. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Since Valley Bank and Dime Savings were not transacting 
business together as "Willowcreek Plaza/' they may not be 
sued in such name. 
Plaintiff spends much time in her brief, as she did in the 
court below, arguing that Valley Bank and Dime Savings were 
transacting business together. Before Valley Bank and Dime Savings 
may be sued by a common name, however, plaintiff must prove that 
not only were they transacting business together, but that they 
were transacting such business under a common name. Rule 17(d), 
Utah R. Civ. P., provides: 
When two or more persons associated in any business 
either as a joint-stock company, a partnership or other 
association, not a corporation, transact such business 
under a common name, whether it comprises the names of 
such associates or not, they may sue or be sued by such 
common name. 
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(Emphasis added). Valley Bank and Dime Savings were no doubt 
associated in a business together, but they were not transacting 
business under a common name as required by Rule 17(d). 
Plaintiff' sole argument for the proposition that Valley Bank 
and Dime Savings were transacting business under a common name is 
that the office complex was known as "Willowcreek Plaza." She 
points the Court to the leases entered into with tenants. The 
leases, however, variously refer to the complex as the "Willow 
Creek Shopping Village," the "Willow Creek Plaza Executive 
Offices," and the "Willow Creek Plaza Development," in addition to 
"Willow Creek Plaza."3 (R. 38-57) Certainly, not all these are 
business names of Valley Bank and Dime Savings. "Willowcreek 
Plaza," as indicated in the affidavit of Brad Baldwin and Wilford 
Goodwill, previously filed in the first action, is simply the name 
of the office complex. It is not a separate legal entity subject 
to suit and it is not the d/b/a of Valley Bank and Dime Savings. 
Accepting plaintiff's argument would mean that any time a 
business which owns a building gives it a name, that is the d/b/a 
of the business. Defense counsel, however, has been unable to find 
any cases, in this jurisdiction or others, so holding. Defense 
3The addendum to the participation agreement upon which 
plaintiff relies further indicates that the property is simply 
known as the "Willow Creek Shopping Village." 
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counsel has been unable to find one case where such an argument has 
even been raised. 
In order to constitute a d/b/af it would seem that the 
entities must actually "do" business together, as the acronym 
implies: "doing business as," Naming a building simply does not 
constitute "doing" business. When Valley Bank and Dime Savings did 
do business together, by entering into leases with tenants, they 
always did so in the name of Valley Bank. None of the leases was 
signed "Valley Bank and Trust Company, d/b/a "Willowcreek Plaza," 
or "Valley Bank and Trust Company and Dime Savings Bank of New 
York, d/b/a Willowcreek Plaza." On the contrary, all business done 
at the Willow Creek Plaza office complex was done in the name of 
Valley Bank alone. 
Because Valley Bank and Dime Savings were not doing business 
as "Willowcreek Plaza," much less under any other common name, they 
may not be sued by that name. It is unfortunate perhaps for 
plaintiff that it is now too late for her to name Valley Bank; 
however, as the Court is aware, a simple title search would have 
revealed the name of the property owner, which plaintiff's counsel 
obviously did not do. 
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II. 
Plaintiff had an opportunity to conduct discovery in the 
court below had she wished. 
Plaintiff further argues that she "never had an opportunity to 
pursue discovery . . . to determine what, if any, other documents 
or material existed to demonstrate that Dime Savings and Valley 
[Bank] were transacting [business] under the common name of 
Willowcreek Plaza." Brief of Appellant at 11. Plaintiff, however, 
never raised this argument in the court below, and should not be 
permitted to do so on appeal. In Onq International (U.S.A.), Inc. 
v. 11th Avenue Corporation, 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993), the Supreme 
Court stated that issues and arguments not raised in the court 
below may not be considered on appeal. J[d. at 455 n. 31. 
In any event, plaintiff did have an opportunity to conduct 
discovery had she wished. Rule 56(f), Utah R. Civ. P., allows a 
party who is unable to "present . . . facts essential" to oppose a 
motion to file an affidavit indicating what discovery he or she 
would like to do and request that the hearing be continued. 
Plaintiff did not file such an affidavit. Nor did she ever, at any 
time in the court below, request an opportunity to do discovery or 
complain that she did not have an opportunity to engage in 
discovery. Plaintiff should not now be heard to argue on appeal 
that she "never had an opportunity to pursue discovery." 
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CONCLUSION 
The order of dismissal of the trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED this zz lay of July, 1994. 
MORGAN 
HANSEN 
for Defendant and 
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